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HOW STRONG IS ARMSTRONG? WHAT TO MAKE OF
MONTANA’S AMBIGUOUS AUTONOMY RIGHTS
IN A POST-ROE WORLD
Ben McKee*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1973, courts in the United States had recognized that the federal
constitution protected the right of persons to obtain an abortion.1 In recent
years, the strength of this right came into question.2 With the perceived shift
in the ideological balance of the United States Supreme Court, beginning
with the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2018,3 state legislatures
across the country passed numerous statutes restricting or banning abortion.4 In 2021, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 8, which banned
abortions at the point when cardiac activity can be detected in the fetus,5
effectively outlawing abortions past six weeks.6 The law was unique in that
its exclusive enforcement mechanism was through private civil action,7 empowering private citizens to bring lawsuits against any person who violates
the law, and providing for an award of $10,000 if successful in court.8 On
emergency application from abortion providers for injunctive relief,9 the
United States Supreme Court ruled five to four not to block the law’s enforcement.10 In her dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted: “Presented with
an application to enjoin a flagrantly unconstitutional law engineered to pro* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of
2023. I would like to thank Professor Anthony Johnstone for his kindness and mentorship, and for
consistently challenging me at each stage in the writing process. And because I cannot express my
gratitude often enough, I would like to thank my wife, Celina, for her love, friendship, and many sacrifices.
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Org., 597 U.S. ___, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 19-1392); see also June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132 (2020), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. ___; Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 607 (2016), abrogated by Dobbs, 597 U.S. ___; Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality), overruled by Dobbs, 597 U.S. ___.
2. Melanie Kalmanson & Riley Erin Fredrick, The Viability of Change: Finding Abortion in
Equality After Obergefell, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 650 (2020).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 667–68.
5. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.204 (2021).
6. Peter N. Salib, Ban Them All; Let the Courts Sort Them Out. Saving Clauses, the Texas Abortion Ban, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 100 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 15 (2021).
7. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.207.
8. Id. § 171.208(b).
9. Emergency Application to Justice Alito for Writ of Injunction at 14, Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, https://perma.cc/VMB7-TSHJ (Aug. 19, 2021) (No. 21-463).
10. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2494–95 (2021).
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hibit women from exercising their constitutional rights and evade judicial
scrutiny, a majority of Justices have opted to bury their heads in the
sand.”11
While challenges to the Texas law continued to make their way
through the courts, of greater concern to abortion rights advocates was the
United States Supreme Court’s agreement to hear arguments regarding a
Mississippi law banning the procedure after 15 weeks,12 where the petitioners had explicitly asked the Court to overturn decades of abortion rights
jurisprudence.13 The Court heard arguments on December 1, 2021,14 in
which remarks by the Justices included Justice Brett Kavanaugh questioning whether the Court should overrule precedent and “return to the position
of neutrality” on the question of abortion;15 Justice Amy Coney Barrett suggesting—with regard to “the consequences of parenting and the obligations
of motherhood that flow from pregnancy”—that “safe haven laws take care
of that problem”;16 and Justice Samuel Alito questioning if “the fetus has an
interest in having a life, and that doesn’t change . . . from the point before
viability to the point after viability.”17
On June 24, 2022, the Court issued its highly anticipated decision in
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which the Court held—
by a vote of five to four—that its prior opinions in Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey “must be overruled,” reasoning that “[t]he Constitution makes no reference to abortion,”
and contrary to the Court’s prior jurisprudence, “no such right is implicitly
protected by any constitutional provision.”18 Laws restricting abortion will
now be upheld under the federal constitution “if there is a rational basis on
which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state
interests.”19
With the fate of federal abortion rights apparently settled, it begets the
question of what effect this will have on the legal protections of abortion in
11. Id. at 2498 (Sotomayor, J., with Breyer and Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
12. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191(4)(b) (2018) (“Except in a medical emergency or in the case
of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not intentionally or knowingly perform, induce, or attempt
to perform or induce an abortion of an unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn
human being has been determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.”).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S.
___, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 19-1392), available at https://perma.cc/DE3J-GD6B.
14. Oral Argument Transcript at 1, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___,
2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 19-1392), available at https://perma.cc/9XCN-XJ7Z.
15. Id. at 80.
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 65–66.
18. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057, at *21 (June
24, 2022) (No. 19-1392).
19. Id. at *108 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319 (1993)).
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Montana. Part II of this Comment reviews early abortion laws in Montana,
leading up to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention and the conversations concerning the right to privacy generally—and abortion specifically—during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution; Part II then
discusses the subsequent federal and state cases shaping those rights, beginning with United States Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,
and culminating with the Montana Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Armstrong v. State.20 Part III examines the unanswered questions regarding the
scope of the Court’s holding in Armstrong and, after a comparative analysis
of abortion rights in other states, offers a revised test for the Court to adopt
in a future case. Part IV demonstrates the effectiveness of this test by applying it to four laws restricting abortion enacted by the Montana Legislature
in 2021. Part V concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
On December 13, 1971, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Roe, a case challenging Texas’s criminal abortion statutes.21
While the parties in Roe awaited the Court’s decision, the Montana Constitutional Convention convened on January 17, 1972.22 The proposed Constitution was approved by the Convention’s delegates two months later on
March 24, 1972,23 and was ratified by the voters on June 6.24 The Supreme
Court called the parties in Roe for re-arguments on October 11.25 Then, on
January 22, 1973—ten months after the close of the Convention, and seven
months after the Constitution’s ratification—the Court announced its opinion in Roe, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected a person’s right to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.26
A. Early Abortion Laws in Montana
The status of abortion during Montana’s territorial years and early
statehood as a serious offense under the law is evident from some of its
20. 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
21. 410 U.S. at 116.
22. 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 109 (1981), available at
https://perma.cc/6L4D-467J.
23. 7 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 3046 (1981), available at
https://perma.cc/2BAD-2YJJ.
24. Charles S. Johnson, Constitution Passes, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 8, 1972, at *1, available at
https://perma.cc/5WW9-LT3G.
25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
26. Id. at 153. This Comment uses gender-specific language when reflecting that used by the cited
court.
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earliest criminal cases and statutes,27 including Montana’s territorial penal
code, which established the performance or procurement of abortions as a
felony:
Every person who shall administer or cause to be administered or taken or
furnish to another to be taken, any medical substance, or shall use or cause
to be used, any instrument whatever with intent to procure the miscarriage
of any woman then being with child (unless the same shall be done to save
the life of such woman), and shall be convicted thereof, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the territorial prison for a term of not less than two years,
nor more than five years.28

The criminal status of abortion continued into early statehood, entailing felony offenses for both the provider and the patient:
Every person who provides, supplies or administers to any pregnant woman,
or procures any such woman to take any medicine, drug or substance, or
uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent
thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
not less than two nor more than five years. . . . Every woman who solicits of
any person any medicine, drug or substance whatever, and takes the same,
or who submits to any operation, or to the use of any means whatever, with
intent thereby to procure a miscarriage, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than
one nor more than five years.29

The Montana Legislature copied the above language from the 1907
statutes verbatim into the 1947 criminal code, which were the statutes in
effect at the time of the 1972 Constitutional Convention and subsequent
ratification.30

27. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50, 52, 1877 WL 3574 (Mont.
1877) (“Consultation with physicians about procuring abortions are not privileged communications
under our statute.”); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Kellogg, 36 P. 957, 961 (Mont. 1894) (“[Dr. Kellogg’s
conduct] is entirely consistent with the fact of his having committed a criminal abortion, and attempting
to conceal the same.”); State v. Hollowell, 256 P. 380, 382 (Mont. 1927) (“And as a principal in the
abortion he was guilty of a felony.”).
28. COMPILED STATUTES OF MONTANA: ENACTED AT THE REGULAR SESSION OF THE FIFTEENTH
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF MONTANA, EMBRACING THE LAWS OF A GENERAL AND PERMANENT NATURE,
IN FORCE AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE FIFTEENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, ch.
4, § 42 (1888), available at https://perma.cc/JG27-WTUA.
29. 2 E.C. DAY, The REVISED CODES OF MONTANA OF 1907: CONTAINING ALL LAWS OF A PERMANENT & GENERAL NATURE IN FORCE AFTER THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE TENTH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
590–91, §§ 8351–52 (1908), available at https://perma.cc/6SHV-W4XU.
30. See REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 94-401 to 402 (1947), available at https://perma.cc/8S6TDLW3; see also Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F. Supp. 20, 21 (D. Mont. 1973) (citing REV. CODES OF MONT.
§§ 94-401 to 402).
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B. Privacy and Abortion in the Drafting and Ratification of the
Montana Constitution
Despite the Court hearing arguments in Roe in December 1971, the
topic of abortion was not prevalent in the delegates’ floor discussions during the Montana Constitutional Convention. The only explicit mention of
abortion on the Convention floor took place on March 7, 1972, while the
delegates debated the protection of inalienable rights under the proposed
language for Article II, Section 3.31 Delegate Robert Kelleher moved to
substitute the word “born” with “conceived,” so that the language would
read: “All persons are conceived free and have certain inalienable rights.”32
Delegate Kelleher explained:
My purpose in this is, what’s the use of having rights of the living if I don’t
have the right to be born? A most defenseless human being in the world is
the human fetus, which is dependent upon its own mother for protection.
And lastly, I would leave to the courts the meaning of when [a person] is
conceived.33

Delegate Wade Dahood, chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee,34 responded to Delegate Kelleher and objected to the motion:
What Delegate Kelleher is attempting to do at this time is, by constitutional
command, prohibit abortion in the State of Montana. That issue was brought
before the [Bill of Rights] committee. We decided that we should not deal
with it within the Bill of Rights. It is a legislative matter insofar as we are
concerned. The world of law has for centuries conducted a debate as to
when a person becomes a person, at what particular state, at what particular
time; and we submit that this particular question should not be decided by
this delegation. It has no part at this time within the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the State of Montana, and we oppose it for that reason.35

Following Delegate Dahood’s comments, the Convention voted down
Delegate Kelleher’s motion to extend inalienable rights to the unborn by a
vote of 71 to 15.36 Delegate Dahood’s reference to the Bill of Rights Committee’s prior discussion of the issue appears to refer to a proposal by Dele31. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1640 (1981), available at
https://perma.cc/L68T-L6CW [hereinafter CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 5]; see also MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 3 (“All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a
clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life’s basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their safety,
health and happiness in all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding
responsibilities.”).
32. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 5, supra note 31, at 1640.
33. Id.
34. 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 22 (1979), available at
https://perma.cc/SW3G-37TW [hereinafter CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 1].
35. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 5, supra note 31, at 1640.
36. Id. at 1641–42.
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gate Kelleher to include a section in the Constitution guaranteeing that “[a]
human fetus has the right to be born.”37
One newspaper covering the March 7 exchange, and the failure of
Delegate Kelleher’s motion, provided additional context to Delegate
Dahood’s assertion that abortion was a legislative matter.38 The Helena Independent Record noted that during the 1971 legislative session immediately preceding the Convention, Representative Dorothy Bradley, a Bozeman Democrat, had introduced a bill to legalize abortions which was defeated in committee.39
To the extent that the subject matter of privacy rights can be divided
into, first, freedom from the disclosure of confidential information—that is,
information privacy—and second, freedom from government interference
in personal decision-making—autonomy privacy40—newspaper coverage
and public commentary during the Convention, regarding a proposed privacy provision under Section 10 of the Article II Declaration of Rights,
emphasized the significance of the information class of privacy. For example, Delegate George James wrote in a column in the Great Falls Tribune
about a concern among the delegates “based on the growing fear of bureaucracy and the growing intrusion of government in our lives,” and that one of
the proposals to address this included the right to privacy, which would
“limit electronic surveillance or bugging.”41
A widely distributed42 pamphlet created in part by Delegate Richard
Roeder explained that “at a time when opportunities for invasion of privacy
are increasing in number and sophistication, section 10 emphasizes that this
right is essential for the preservation of a free society,” and described the
right of privacy as intending “to protect the citizen from Government invasion of his privacy.”43 The official Voter Information Pamphlet described
Article II, Section 10 simply as a “[n]ew provision prohibiting any invasion
of privacy unless the good of the state makes it necessary.”44 Further, two
37. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 1, supra note 34, at 223.
38. Abortion Issue Flares, Fails in Con Con, HELENA INDEP. RECORD, Mar. 7, 1972, at *148, available at https://perma.cc/ZL5D-NPSA.
39. Id.
40. See State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 448 (Mont. 1997) (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654–55 (Cal. 1994)).
41. George James, Con-Con Comments by the Delegates from District 23, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE,
Feb 5, 1972, at *7, available at https://perma.cc/ZL5D-NPSA.
42. Tyler M. Stockton, Originalism and the Montana Constitution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 117, 122
(2016).
43. CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENT, PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF MONTANA 2, 11 (1972), available at https://perma.cc/T4KT-P32J [hereinafter ROEDER PAMPHLET].
44. PROPOSED 1972 CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MONTANA: OFFICIAL TEXT WITH EXPLANATION 6 (1972), available at https://perma.cc/M2Q7-Z4UZ.
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days after the delegates voted to approve the draft of the Constitution and
send it to voters, the Great Falls Tribune opined in a glowing editorial that
the delegates “avoided mistakes convention delegates in other states made
by including emotional and controversial issues such as abortion and aid to
parochial schools.”45
By scanning this sort of commentary, emphasizing only information
privacy and ignoring protections related to personal autonomy, a straightforward and listless analysis might conclude “[t]hat the Convention’s discussion of the constitutional language did not include discussion of abortion
. . . suggests the delegates did not believe the language covered abortion.”46
However, observers of the Convention were acutely aware of the possibility that the language in the new Constitution would be interpreted in the
ongoing debates in Montana and the nation surrounding the legal status of
abortion.47 In 1969—four years before Roe—the California Supreme Court
held that the unenumerated right to privacy in the federal constitution, as
well as privacy rights in its state constitution, protected “[t]he fundamental
right of the woman to choose whether to bear children.”48 The court stated
that such a conclusion followed from the United States Supreme Court’s
1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,49 where the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the privacy of
married couples in family planning and the use of contraceptives.50
This development did not go unnoticed in Montana. In the months
leading up to 1972, the Great Falls Tribune reported in its coverage of the
upcoming Convention that “[t]he right to privacy may be a key issue if the
delegates decide to debat[e] abortion,” noting that “[t]he California Supreme Court ruled . . . that the right of privacy in the U.S. Constitution
covers the right of a woman to an abortion.”51
As additional commentary, in his pamphlet distributed during the ratification period, Billings lawyer Gerald J. Neely52 posed the question of
whether another proposed provision in the Declaration of Rights, specifically, Section 15—“Rights of Persons Not Adults”—inadvertently created a
45. Congratulations, Con Con delegates, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, March 26, 1972, at *34, available
at https://perma.cc/N7MU-JCDB.
46. Andrew P. Morriss, Opting for Change or Continuity? Thinking About ‘Reforming’ the Judicial
Article of Montana’s Constitution, 72 MONT. L. REV. 27, 45 n.85 (2011).
47. See, e.g., Frank Adams, Emotion-Packed Abortion Issue May Face Con Con Delegates, GREAT
FALLS TRIBUNE, Oct. 29, 1971, at 18, available at https://perma.cc/FL99-JUH2.
48. California v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. See id. at 481–86.
51. Adams, supra note 47, at 18.
52. GERALD J. NEELY, THE NEW MONTANA CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL LOOK *3 (1972), available
at https://perma.cc/Q59W-EW5F.
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constitutional ban on abortion because of its interaction with existing statute:
An example of the potential problem areas that will face the legislature [because of the proposed Article II, Section 15] is this: under current Montana
statute, an unborn child is deemed to be an existing person “so far as may be
necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth.” If unborn
children are deemed to be existing persons, and all existing persons have the
constitutional rights of all others, is it arguable that Montana, with passage
of the rights of minors provision would have an anti-abortion statute already
on the books?53

Finally, in a pivotal moment on the Convention floor and on the same
day as Delegate Kelleher’s motion to include an anti-abortion provision in
Article II, Section 3, Delegate Bob Campbell rose and expressed his support
for the proposed Article II, Section 10, stating:
[T]oday we have observed an increasingly complex society and we know
that our area of privacy has decreased, decreased, and decreased. The United
States Supreme Court, in Griswold versus Connecticut, had to construe the
right of privacy as an implied right and, in that case, held that the right of
privacy extended into the marital privacy, that the state did not have a compelling state interest in going into the bedroom of a married couple to prevent contraception. And they ruled the Connecticut anticontraception law
invalid as invading the right of privacy. Now, we don’t know how the interpretations will go from there, what the Supreme Court will do.54

By citing Griswold, Delegate Campbell asserted that Article II, Section
10, if approved by the delegates, would encompass the same autonomy privacy the United States Supreme Court determined protected married
couples from state intrusion in family planning and the use of contraceptives55—procreative autonomy. In addition, Delegate Campbell acknowledged that the right to privacy, or at least the privacy protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment,56 had been and would continue to be subject to
interpretation by the judiciary.57
The role of the courts up to this point in shaping the scope of these
novel privacy rights was also understood outside the Convention. Following
the close of the Convention and during the period when Montana voters
53. Id. at *8 (citing MONT. CONST. art II, § 15 (“The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall
include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by
laws which enhance the protection of such persons.”)). Although Neely uses quotation marks in quoting
statutory language, he does not cite to any source. Neely appears to be quoting REV. CODE OF MONT.
§ 64-103 (1947), available at https://perma.cc/4USM-PC3X (“A child conceived, but not yet born, is to
be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent
birth.”).
54. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 5, supra note 31, at 1681.
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
56. Id. at 481–86.
57. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 5, supra note 31, at 1681.
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were gathering information and reflecting on whether to ratify or reject the
new Constitution, a column in the Billings Gazette told readers that “[t]he
Right of Privacy . . . section of the proposed Montana constitution to be
voted on June 6, is another embarkation into new fields which would appear
lofty and well meaning.”58 The column included the input of a University of
Montana School of Law student, tying Article II, Section 10 to the federal
right of privacy which “has been suggested in some modern Supreme Court
decisions.”59
Delegate Campbell later expanded on his prior comments regarding
judicial interpretation of autonomy privacy when explaining his support for
broad language in Section 10.60 Delegate Campbell rose in response to a
motion seeking to reinsert the phrase “without the showing of a compelling
state interest,” which had been included by the Bill of Rights Committee’s
proposal but had subsequently been removed by a vote on the floor of the
Convention.61 He predicted that the Montana Supreme Court “certainly are
going to interpret the right of privacy. We had much discussion before our
committee, and why not try to define the right, to put in specific examples.”62 Delegate Campbell predicted that there would be “other areas in the
future which may be developed by the court,” which he did not want to
preclude by defining the right of privacy with too great of specificity.63
After Delegate Ask indicated that the purpose of his motion was to add
clarification that the right to privacy was not absolute, but rather must be
interpreted within the constraints of what was “reasonable” and “justifiable,”64 the Convention voted to reinsert the phrase “without the showing of
a compelling state interest,”65 so that the final language included in the
Declaration of Rights—approved by the Convention and later ratified by
Montana’s voters—read: “The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest.”66

58. A New Threat to Freedoms, BILLINGS GAZETTE, May 5, 1972, at *19, available at https://
perma.cc/A82A-ZMWG.
59. Id. at *19 (quoting Emilie Loring).
60. 6 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1851 (1981), available at
https://perma.cc/CPQ6-UK85 [hereinafter CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 6].
61. Id. at 1850.
62. Id. at 1851.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1852.
65. Id. at 1852–53.
66. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
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C. Cases Shaping Montana’s Right to Autonomy Privacy
1. Beginning with Roe
On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court expanded the
right of privacy it had previously recognized in Griswold to include a person’s right to decide whether to obtain an abortion.67
At the time, abortion remained a serious criminal offense in Montana,
permissible only when necessary to save the life of the patient.68 The Texas
statute invalidated in Roe similarly restricted legal abortions to those “for
the purpose of saving the life of the mother.”69 The Court in Roe held that
such statutes were subject to strict scrutiny,70 and failed for being overbroad, as they made “no distinction between abortions performed early in
pregnancy and those performed later,”71 and limited “the legal justification
for the procedure”72 to one reason only—“‘saving’ the mother’s life.”73
The Court created a trimester framework for determining the constitutionality of laws regulating or prohibiting abortion, holding that states lack a
compelling interest prior to the end of the first trimester, and even at that
point may only regulate abortion “to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.”74 Not until the point of viability, when the fetus “has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother’s womb,”75 does the state have a compelling interest
in “potential life” to justify proscribing abortions outright.76 The Court estimated the point of viability as existing somewhere between 24 and 28
weeks—essentially, at the start of the third trimester.77
67. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
597 U.S. ___, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 19-1392) (“This right of privacy, whether it
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
68. See REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 94-401 to 402; see also Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F. Supp. 20, 21 (D.
Mont. 1973) (citing REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 94-401 to 402).
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (quoting 2A TEX. PENAL CODE arts. 1191–94, 1196 (1961)).
70. Id. at 165–66 (“The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as
the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state
interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to
his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.”).
71. Id. at 164.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting 2A TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1196).
74. Id. at 163.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 163–64.
77. Id. at 160.
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Three months after the Court announced its decision in Roe, a Montana woman in the first trimester of pregnancy brought a suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana seeking a declaratory judgment that Montana’s criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional.78 She
was represented by former Delegate Bob Campbell, whose comments on
procreative autonomy—discussed above—had shaped the discussions of
privacy rights during the 1972 Constitutional Convention.79 In Doe v.
Woodahl, the district court compared Montana’s statutes criminalizing
abortion to the Texas statutes struck down in Roe, and—although Montana
Attorney General Robert Woodahl had issued an opinion in the immediate
aftermath of Roe vaguely asserting that at least one of the Montana statutes
“present[ed] a different legislative purpose and enactment which has not
been ruled on by the United States Supreme Court”80—the district court
found that the Montana statutes as a whole were “in substance no different
from the laws of Texas” because they were not “tailored to accommodate
the conflicting rights of pregnant women and the interests of the state.”81
On May 29, 1973,82 the district court held that, under the federal constitution, Montana’s abortion statutes were “unconstitutional and void in their
entirety.”83
In response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe and
its application by the federal district court in striking down the state’s abortion statutes as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Montana Legislature enacted the Abortion Control Act of 1974,84 which created “statutory
limitations upon the performance of abortions intended to correspond with
the guidelines” set forth by the federal courts, “limit[ing] the performance
of abortion after the first 3-month period of gestation,” and prohibiting
abortions post-viability.85
If the history of post-1973 abortion legislation in Montana can be conceptualized as appearing in four waves over time, the Legislature’s enactment of the Abortion Control Act—filling the void left behind by the invalidation of the prior statutes—represented the first phase in this saga.

78. Joan Uda, Abortion: Roe v. Wade and the Montana Dilemma, 35 MONT. L. REV. 103, 110
(1974).
79. Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F. Supp. 20, 21 (D. Mont. 1973).
80. Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 35-9, at 18 (Feb. 22, 1973), available at https://perma.cc/Y2ZE-Z8MG.
81. Doe, 360 F. Supp. at 21–22.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Id. at 22.
84. REV. CODES OF MONT. §§ 94-5-613 to 94-5-624.
85. Gerald J. Navratil, Recent Developments—Legislation: The Abortion Control Act, 36 MONT. L.
REV. 155, 159 (1975).
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2. Continuing with Casey
Nearly two decades after its decision in Roe, the Court revisited its
prior abortion jurisprudence in its landmark decision in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.86 In a plurality opinion
authored by three of the Justices, the Court upheld the “essential holding”
of Roe, which the plurality synthesized as having three parts:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.
Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the
State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And
third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of
the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus
that may become a child.87

The plurality thus replaced Roe’s trimester framework and strict scrutiny analysis with a new “undue burden” test, in which states could regulate
abortion prior to viability so long as such a regulation did not have “the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.”88 The plurality clarified that “[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause.”89 Consistent with the Court’s holding in Roe,90
the Casey plurality affirmed a state’s power to proscribe abortions after the
point of viability.91 However, the plurality recognized that medical advances since Roe had allowed for the possibility of fetal viability at 23 to 24
weeks, and thus the 28-week figure cited in Roe was medically outdated.92
Casey led to a second phase of post-1973 abortion legislation in Montana, in which, beginning in 1995, the Legislature enacted a series of
amendments to the Abortion Control Act of 1974, such as the Woman’s
Right to Know Act,93 the purpose of which included to “ensure that every
woman who is considering an abortion receive complete information on
86. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), overruled by
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 191392).
87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (plurality).
88. Id. at 877.
89. Id. at 874.
90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973), overruled by Dobbs, 597 U.S. ___.
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
92. Id. at 860.
93. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-301 to 50-20-308 (1995).
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alternatives.”94 This wave of legislation continued in 1997 with a bill banning “partial-birth” abortions,95 although the law was later invalidated in
Montana district court on the grounds of unconstitutional vagueness and
violating the right to privacy under Article II, Section 10.96
The 1995 legislative session also saw the passage of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act,97 which required minors to notify a parent prior to
obtaining an abortion.98 The law offered a narrow judicial bypass whereby
a court could grant a waiver if it found that the parental notification would
not be in the minor’s best interests.99 Following a challenge in federal district court, the law was eventually upheld by the United States Supreme
Court.100 Aided by predictions among legal commentators that the Parental
Notice of Abortion Act, “irrespective of its constitutionality under the federal constitution, impermissibly abridges a pregnant minor’s inalienable
right to privacy under the Montana Constitution,”101 the challengers then
brought suit in Montana district court.102 There, the district court held the
law unconstitutionally infringed on the right to privacy protected by Article
II, Section 10.103
3. Culminating with Armstrong
The 1995 amendments to the Abortion Control Act also included a
new prohibition on physician assistants performing abortions.104 Susan Cahill, the only physician assistant licensed to perform abortions in Montana
at that time, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Montana alongside a group of licensed physicians, including her employer, Dr. James Armstrong, arguing the law created the kind of unconstitutional undue burden prohibited by Casey.105 The federal district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction because it found
they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on such a claim under
Casey.106 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir94. Id. § 50-20-302(2)(a).
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997).
96. Intermnt. Planned Parenthood v. State, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 782, at *23 (June 29, 1998)
(No. BDV 97-477).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-201 to 50-20-215 (1995) (repealed 2011).
98. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997).
99. Id. at 293.
100. Id. at 299.
101. Matthew B. Hayhurst, Parental Notification of Abortion and Minors’ Rights under the Montana
Constitution, 58 MONT. L. REV. 565, 597 (1997).
102. Wicklund v. State, No. ADV 97-671, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1116, at *1 (Feb. 11, 1999).
103. Id. at *11, *23.
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (1995).
105. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 969–71 (1997).
106. Id. at 971.
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cuit vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction, in
part because the district court had failed to appropriately account for the
hardships that the law placed on Cahill, the other plaintiffs, and their patients.107
The State of Montana petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari, and on June 16, 1997,108 the Court issued an opinion reversing
the court of appeals.109 The Court found that the law did not create an undue burden, relying in part on pre-Casey precedent that “to ensure the safety
of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physicians perform abortions,”110 and that such legislation “infringe[s] upon no realm of
personal privacy secured by the Constitution against state interference.”111
The Court also noted a lack of “evidence suggesting an unlawful motive on
the part of the Montana Legislature.”112
On October 1, 1997, Cahill and the other plaintiffs brought suit in
Montana district court, seeking an injunction on several grounds, including
that the law violated the right of individual privacy guaranteed under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.113 Two years prior, the
Montana Supreme Court had issued a landmark opinion on the Montana
Constitution’s protections of autonomy privacy, in Gryczan v. State.114
There, the Court determined the two-prong test suggested by Justice John
Marshall Harlan in his concurrence in Katz v. United States115—for determining the scope of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment116—was the
appropriate test for determining the scope of autonomy privacy under Article II, Section 10.117 This test required first, that the person asserting the
right have had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that
this expectation of privacy be one that society would recognize as reasonable.”118 Because the right to privacy was one explicitly protected in the
Declaration of Rights—and was therefore a fundamental right—any legislation regulating an activity within the scope of autonomy privacy—as deter107. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 968.
109. Id. at 976.
110. Id. at 974–75 (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 447
(1983)).
111. Id. at 974 (quoting Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975)).
112. Id. at 976.
113. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 367, 372 (Mont. 1999).
114. 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
115. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
117. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 122.
118. Id. at 121 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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mined by the Katz test—must be subject to strict scrutiny.119 In applying
the Katz test to a statute criminalizing consensual sex between adults of the
same gender, the Montana Supreme Court found that such conduct fell
within the scope of Article II, Section 10,120 and determined that the statute
failed constitutional muster under strict scrutiny because the state lacked
any compelling interests.121 In its opinion, the Court emphasized that Article II, Section 10 “affords citizens broader protection of their right to privacy than does the federal constitution.”122
On November 25, 1997, the district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Cahill, enjoining the state from enforcing the 1995 amendments—prohibiting physician assistants from performing abortions—
against her and Dr. Armstrong.123 The district court granted its order based
in part on the merits of the plaintiffs’ Article II, Section 10 claims.124 The
state then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.125
The Court issued its decision on October 26, 1999.126 In opening its
discussion of the right to privacy, the Court provided a general rule for its
scope in the context of personal autonomy: “Article II, Section 10 of the
Montana Constitution broadly guarantees each individual the right to make
medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health in partnership with a chosen health care provider free from government interference.”127
The Court then went on to state a more specific rule regarding the
Montana Constitution’s protections of reproductive rights: “More narrowly,
we conclude that Article II, Section 10, protects a woman’s right of procreative autonomy—i.e., here, the right to seek and to obtain a specific lawful
medical procedure, a pre-viability abortion, from a health care provider of
her choice.”128
The Court looked to some of the same remarks from the Constitutional
Convention discussed above,129 and concluded:
[G]iven the Constitutional Convention’s unmistakable intent to textualize
this tradition [of individual privacy] by explicitly protecting citizens from
legislation and governmental practices that interfere with the autonomy of
each individual to make decisions in matters generally considered private;
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 121.
Armstrong v. State, 1997 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 810, at *19 (Nov. 25, 1997) (No. BDV 97-627).
Id. at *12–13.
Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 372 (Mont. 1999).
Id. at 364.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 373–77.
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given the Convention’s reliance on Griswold; and given jurisprudential recognition, following the close of the Constitutional Convention, of a woman’s right to seek and obtain a pre-viability abortion, it is clear that the
procreative autonomy component of personal autonomy is protected by
Montana’s constitutional right of individual privacy found at Article II, Section 10.130

The Court further emphasized the importance of the Constitutional Convention’s reliance on Griswold as an inspiration for Article II, Section 10, as
Griswold had recognized the right to procreative autonomy—that decisions
affecting reproduction are so personal that people must be permitted to
make such decisions without state interference.131 The Court went on:
Implicit in this right of procreative autonomy is a woman’s moral right and
moral responsibility to decide, up to the point of fetal viability, what her
pregnancy demands of her in the context of her individual values, her beliefs
as to the sanctity of life, and her personal situation. Moreover, the State has
no more compelling interest or constitutional justification for interfering
with the exercise of this right if the woman chooses to terminate her previability pregnancy than it would if she chose to carry the fetus to term.132

Here, the Court expressed its concern that granting the government dominion over a person’s reproductive decisions could lead to the government
mandating abortion for certain groups or instituting eugenics programs.133
The Court pointed to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v.
Bell,134 upholding Virginia’s use of forced sterilization135 on the “manifestly unfit” to prevent them “from continuing their kind.”136 In summing
up these concerns, the Court reiterated:
Unless fundamental constitutional rights—procreative autonomy being the
present example—are grounded in something more substantial than the prevailing political winds, Huxley’s Brave New World or Orwell’s 1984 will
always be as close as the next election. Fortunately, as demonstrated above,
the roots of Montana’s constitutional right of procreative autonomy go much
deeper and are firmly embedded in the right of individual privacy guaranteed under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.137

The Court then applied its analysis to Cahill and the other plaintiffs’
claims that the 1995 amendments to the Abortion Control Act were unconstitutional:
The reality of this case is that, while the legislature could not make previability abortions facially unlawful, it . . . attempt[ed] to make it as diffi130. Id. at 377.
131. Id. (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 106 (First Vintage Books ed. 1994)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 377–78.
134. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
135. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 208 (1927).
136. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 377–78 (quoting Buck, 274 U.S. at 207).
137. Id. at 378.
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cult, as inconvenient and as costly as possible for women to exercise their
right to obtain, from the health care provider of their choice, a specific medical procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution and, independently of the Fourteenth Amendment, protected by their
greater right of individual privacy under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.138

Here, the Court distinguished the Montana Constitution’s autonomy privacy
protections from those in the federal constitution, because the former required more than just “that the State simply not impose an undue burden,”139 but rather, that it must affirmatively “demonstrate a compelling
state interest for infringing this right.”140 However, the Court did not rule
out that such interests may exist and would be within the power of the
Legislature to address:
Certainly, this right of choice in making personal health care decisions and
in exercising personal autonomy is not without limits. In narrowly defined
instances the state, by clear and convincing evidence, may demonstrate a
compelling interest in and obligation to legislate or regulate to preserve the
safety, health and welfare of a particular class of patients or the general
public from a medically-acknowledged, bonafide health risk.141

The Court clarified that outside such narrow circumstances, the Legislature
has no role in or authority over the relationship between a patient and their
health care provider, as that relationship was protected from state infringement under Article II, Section 10.142 In applying a strict scrutiny analysis to
the 1995 amendments to the Abortion Control Act, the Court found “there
was no predicate compelling state interest justifying the amendments.”143
The Court declined to determine whether the legislation would have otherwise been narrowly tailored.144
In addition to finding that procreative autonomy was protected within
the right of individual privacy under Article II, Section 10, the Court made
quick mention that other rights under the Montana Constitution were implicated as well, including the inalienable rights of safety, health, and happiness protected by Article II, Section 3,145 the rights to dignity and equal
protection under Article II, Section 4,146 and the right to reject religious
138. Id. at 381–82 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
140. Id. (citing Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 122 (Mont. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 380 (italics in original).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 382.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 383 (citing MONT. CONST. art II, § 3 (“All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include . . . seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways.”)).
146. Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art II, § 4 (“The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.”)).
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doctrine under Article II, Sections 5147 and 7.148 The Court also applied a
brief substantive due process analysis, similar to those used by the United
States Supreme Court, finding that “[t]he right to due process of law, Article II, Section 17,149 protects those rights—including rights of personal and
procreative autonomy—inherent in the historical concept of ‘ordered liberty.’”150
In holding that a person’s procreative autonomy was protected by Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution, the Court was unanimous—
seven to zero.151
Following the Court’s decision in Armstrong, Montana saw a relative
lull in abortion legislation. In 2005, in a rare exception to the inactivity that
defined this period, the Legislature at last responded to the Armstrong decision by expanding which practitioners could perform abortions—although
narrowly restricting the practice to only licensed physicians and physician
assistants.152 This lull in legislation continued until 2011, when, in a third
wave of post-1973 legislation, the Legislature passed a new incarnation of
the Parental Notice of Abortion Act,153 which the Legislature then repealed
and replaced in 2013 with the Parental Consent for Abortion Act.154
In 2018, a certified nurse practitioner operating out of a Whitefish
clinic she co-owned with Susan Cahill, the prevailing plaintiff in Armstrong, brought suit alongside a certified nurse-midwife challenging the
Legislature’s revised practitioner limits.155 The district court issued a declaratory judgment that the statute violated the right of privacy under Article II, Section 10, and granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction.156 In
Weems v. State, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed its prior holding in
Armstrong that “a statute preventing a woman from obtaining a lawful medical procedure—a pre-viability abortion—from a health care provider of her
choosing unconstitutionally infringe[s] her right to individual privacy under
147. Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5 (“The state shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”)).
148. Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech
or expression.”)).
149. Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. II § 17 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”)).
150. Id. Although the Court uses quotation marks around the words “ordered liberty,” it does not cite
to any source. The Court appears to be quoting Palko v. Connecticut, “[I]mmunities that are valid as
against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
become valid as against the states.” 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937).
151. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 384.
152. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (2005).
153. See id. §§ 50-20-201 to 50-20-235 (2011) (repealed 2013).
154. See id. §§ 50-20-501 to 50-20-511 (2013).
155. Weems v. State, 440 P.3d 4, 6–7 (Mont. 2019).
156. Id. at 4.
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Montana’s Constitution,”157 and affirmed the district court’s order of injunctive relief.158
However, in contrast to the unanimous decision in Armstrong, three
Justices dissented from the Court’s opinion.159 In his dissent, Justice Rice,
joined by Justices McKinnon and Shea, quoted from the Court’s 2006 decision in Wiser v. State160—discussed below—which employed narrow, isolated language from Armstrong to emphasize the “lawful” characteristic of
medical procedures protected by Article II, Section 10, as well as the licensure status and competence of the provider.161 As this paper will discuss,
the lack of clarity surrounding Armstrong’s holding—what it is and what it
is not—has created issues for the Court which will surely escalate if not
resolved, given the federal dismantling of Casey and Roe.
III. ANALYSIS

OF

AUTONOMY RIGHTS AFTER Armstrong

Here, this paper will look to the unanswered questions regarding the
scope of the Montana Supreme Court’s holding in Armstrong and the issues
this ambiguity has caused—and will continue to cause—in subsequent
cases. This paper will then conduct a comparative analysis of abortion
rights in states with similar privacy protections in their state constitutions.
Finally, Part III will culminate in the unveiling of a simplified test for the
Court to apply in future cases.
A. Problems with the Scope of Procreative Autonomy Under Armstrong
Although the Court’s opinion in Armstrong was in some ways unequivocal regarding the strength of the Montana Constitution’s protection of
reproductive rights from “the prevailing political winds,”162 the Court
seemed to also rely in its judgment on the legal status of abortion, referencing the termination of pregnancies “at a time the law allows”163 and repeatedly referring to pre-viability abortions as a “lawful medical procedure.”164
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at 17 (Rice, J., with McKinnon and Shea, JJ., dissenting).
160. 129 P.3d 133 (Mont. 2006).
161. Weems, 440 P.3d at 14 (Rice, J., with McKinnon and Shea, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Wiser, 129
P.3d at 137).
162. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 378 (Mont. 1999).
163. Id. at 383.
164. See Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 368 (“[T]he statutory amendments at issue prevent a woman from
obtaining a lawful medical procedure—a pre-viability abortion . . . .”); id. at 370 (“Article II, Section 10,
protects . . . the right to seek and to obtain a specific lawful medical procedure, a pre-viability abortion
. . . .”); id. at 380 (“[T]he legislature has no interest . . . to justify its interference with an individual’s
fundamental privacy right to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure . . . .”); id. at 381 (“[T]he
government failed utterly to demonstrate . . . that the State had a compelling interest for effectively
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The Court also placed weight on the fact that the state Board of Medical
Examiners had determined Cahill’s competence to perform abortions, implying that the Board’s professional judgment should not be questioned by
the Legislature165—while overlooking the fact that the Board was composed of political appointees subject to confirmation by the Legislature’s
upper house, and included only 5 medical doctors among its 11 members.166
This emphasis on the legality of the medical procedure in question has
led to greater confusion since Armstrong. In a later case in which a group of
denturists brought an Armstrong-based Article II, Section 10 challenge167 to
Montana’s requirement that denturists refer partial denture patients to dentists,168 the Court in Wiser v. State selectively quoted language from Armstrong to narrow the scope of its holding:
[W]hile recognizing that the right to privacy was implicated in health care
choices, Armstrong nonetheless specifically defined the right as guaranteeing access to a chosen health care provider who has been determined “competent” by the medical community and “licensed” to perform the procedure
desired. Armstrong did not hold that there is a right to see a health care
provider who is not licensed to provide the services desired.169

As discussed above, the dissenting Justices in the Court’s 2018 decision in
Weems quoted Wiser’s narrow and specific language as the correct rule
from Armstrong regarding the Montana Constitution’s protections of procreative autonomy.170
In a subsequent challenge to Montana’s restrictions on medical marijuana,171 the district court relied on Armstrong in determining that such
restrictions violated the plaintiffs’ rights under Article II, Section 10.172
However, on appeal, the Court disagreed:
In Armstrong, the statute at issue prevented individuals from receiving a
lawful, constitutionally protected medical procedure, abortion. Both the U.S.
Supreme Court and this Court recognized that prohibiting a woman from
obtaining an abortion violates her personal autonomy, and therefore, her
infringing the right of procreative autonomy of women to obtain a pre-viability abortion and their right
of personal autonomy to choose P.A. Cahill, under the supervision of Dr. Armstrong, to perform this
lawful medical procedure.”); id. at 384 (“[W]e hold that Article II, Section 10, protects a woman’s right
of procreative autonomy—here, the right to seek and to obtain a specific lawful medical procedure, a
pre-viability abortion . . . .”).
165. Id. at 381.
166. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-1841(2), (3) (1999).
167. Wiser v. State, 129 P.3d 133, 137 (Mont. 2006).
168. Id. at 136.
169. Id. at 137 (quoting Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 380) (internal citation omitted).
170. Weems v. State, 440 P.3d 4, 14 (Mont. 2019) (Rice, J., with McKinnon and Shea, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Wiser, 129 P.3d at 137).
171. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Mont. 2012).
172. Id. at 1167.
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right to privacy. . . . Unlike Roe and Armstrong, Plaintiffs’ alleged affirmative right to access a particular drug has not been constitutionally protected
under the right to privacy.173

The Court utilized circular reasoning here, suggesting that the threshold
condition for a medical procedure being constitutionally protected was its
existing status of constitutional protection.
Curiously, at no point in its opinion in Armstrong did the Court employ or even acknowledge the Katz test—which it had relied on in Gryczan
only two years prior—in its determination that obtaining an abortion fell
within the scope of the privacy protected by Article II, Section 10. In an
unrelated case from earlier that same year, which the Montana Supreme
Court never heard, a Montana district court applied the Katz test for this
very purpose:
The first prong questions whether individuals have an expectation of privacy
in the involved activity. What could be more private than an individual’s
decision as to whether to conceive and/or carry a child? As is the case in
almost any medical procedure, a woman’s decision to consider abortion certainly carries with it an expectation of privacy. The second prong considers
whether society is willing to recognize as reasonable, an expectation of privacy as to a woman’s decision on whether or not to have [an] abortion.
While many Montanans do not approve of abortion, this Court cannot say
that society is unwilling to recognize as reasonable, a woman’s expectation
of privacy in her very personal decision as to whether she should carry a
pre-viable fetus. This Court concludes that a woman’s decision to choose a
pre-viability abortion is covered by Montana’s right to privacy.174

Perhaps most troubling in the Court’s limited abortion jurisprudence is
that, although the Court has been clear that the express protections of individual privacy in the Montana Constitution are independent of and broader
than the privacy rights implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,175 the Court never quite provides any assurance that its protections of abortion specifically are built on a foundation separate from Roe,
or whether, after one pulls back the curtain on Armstrong’s careful references to lawful medical procedures, the Court is really just marching in
lockstep with the federal judiciary. There is a non-frivolous argument to be
made that Armstrong and the cases that cite it rest on a fragile three-part
premise: The Montana Constitution protects at least as much privacy as the
Fourteenth Amendment; and the United States Supreme Court has held that
abortion rights are included in those privacy protections; therefore, abortion
rights—as they are discussed in Roe—are included in the privacy protected
by the Montana Constitution.
173. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 384).
174. Planned Parenthood v. State, 1999 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1117, at *7–8 (Mar. 12, 1999) (No. BDV
95-722).
175. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 375 (citing Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997)).
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The obvious question then becomes: When five Justices on the United
States Supreme Court decide that abortion rights are not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, do the Montana Constitution’s protections come
tumbling down?
B. Abortion as Privacy in Other States
Montana is one of 14 states whose supreme courts have recognized a
state constitutional right to abortion, independent of the federal constitutional right first recognized in Roe.176 The courts of ten of those states have
based their abortion rights decisions—at least in part—on a theory of privacy.177 The remaining four have grounded such rights in due process or
equal protection clauses, a broad protection of liberty, or some otherwise
ambiguous rationales.178 Of the nine states that Montana joins in recognizing abortion rights under the right of privacy, six of those states provide
helpful analyses for comparing to the prior jurisprudence in Montana.
California expressly protects privacy in its constitution as an inalienable right,179 which the California Supreme Court held as early as 1969—
three years before the inclusion of that right in the Montana Constitution—
includes “[t]he fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children.”180 In a later case, the court clarified that this right under its state
constitution is “at least as broad as that described in Roe v. Wade.”181 Restrictions on abortion in California are subject to strict scrutiny,182 and for
the purposes of that test, the “protection of a nonviable fetus is not a compelling state interest.”183
In another state with an express right to privacy in its constitution,184
the Alaska Supreme Court held that this right to privacy protects “fundamental reproductive rights [which] include the right to an abortion,” the
scope of which is “similar to that expressed in Roe v. Wade.”185 Interestingly, the court has deliberately declined to march in lockstep with federal
abortion jurisprudence, explicitly rejecting “the narrower definition of that
176. PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALY497 (3d ed. 2020).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”).
180. California v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969).
181. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal. 1981).
182. Myers, 625 P.2d at 793.
183. Id. at 796.
184. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.”).
185. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997).
SIS
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right promulgated in the plurality opinion in Casey.”186 Legal constraints to
reproductive rights are subject to strict scrutiny.187
Florida’s constitution also has an express guarantee of the right to privacy,188 and the Supreme Court of Florida has held that this right includes
the fundamental right of a woman to decide “whether to end her pregnancy.”189 In the first trimester, abortion “may not be significantly restricted by the state.”190 After the first trimester, state restrictions are still
subject to strict scrutiny, and prior to viability, “maternal health” may be a
compelling state interest, but not until the point of viability may the “potentiality of life” be asserted as such an interest.191
In the absence of an express provision, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has recognized a right to privacy implied in three separate sections of
its constitution,192 and held that this right protects both the obtaining of an
abortion and the decision-making process that precedes it.193 Restrictions
on abortion are subject to strict scrutiny, and the state cannot assert a compelling interest in “potential life” prior to viability.194 However, the court
primarily relied on Roe—not the privacy protections in its state constitution—in drawing the viability line with regards to that interest.195
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has also recognized an implied right
to privacy in the state’s common law and as an unenumerated right protected by the state constitution,196 and held that this right includes “autonomous bodily integrity,” which in turn includes the “right to have an abortion.”197 The court adopted Casey’s undue burden test for state regulation of
pre-viability abortions.198
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Right of privacy. Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.
This section shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law.”).
189. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1193–94.
192. Women of the State v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1995) (citing MINN. CONST. art. I,
§ 2 (law of the land); id. § 7 (due process); id. § 10 (search and seizure)).
193. Id. at 31.
194. Id. at 31–32.
195. Id. at 31–32.
196. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1039–40 (Miss. 1985) (citing MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32
(unenumerated rights)).
197. Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 653 (Miss. 1998).
198. Id. at 655.
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Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized an implied right
to privacy derived from various provisions of its constitution,199 and held
that this right includes a woman’s fundamental right “to terminate her pregnancy.”200 Similar to the Alaska Supreme Court, the Tennessee court explicitly rejected the Casey test and asserted that strict scrutiny remained the
appropriate standard of review for restrictions on this fundamental right.201
The court recognized that the state “has a compelling interest in maternal
health from the beginning of pregnancy,”202 but held that the state’s interest
in “potential life” does not become compelling until viability.203 However,
in 2014, the court’s holdings on abortion rights were effectively overruled
by a voter-approved amendment to the state constitution stating that
“[n]othing in this Constitution secures or protects a right to abortion.”204
C. The Armstrong 2.0 Test
This paper contends that the Montana Supreme Court should clarify its
prior holding on the scope of abortion rights protected under the Montana
Constitution as follows:
Article II, Section 10 protects the fundamental right of procreative autonomy, which includes the right to a pre-viability abortion.

For the purposes of discussing this test, this paper will refer to the above
language as “Armstrong 2.0.”
Because the Court in Armstrong did not rely on the Katz test to determine that procreative autonomy is within the scope of Article II, Section 10,
there is no need to return to that question. Notably, none of the six state
supreme courts discussed above utilized the Katz test to determine whether
abortion was within the scope of the right to privacy protected in their state
constitutions. Additionally, as demonstrated by the above analysis conducted by one Montana district court, a person’s decision to obtain a previability abortion clearly passes the Katz test.
Despite its reliance on Roe, the Court in Armstrong did not borrow its
medically arbitrary205 trimester framework, and there is no need for the
199. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 27 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Davis
v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992)).
200. Id. at 12.
201. Id. at 17.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. TENN. CONST. art. I § 36.
205. Justice Harry Blackmun, author of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), infamously wrote in a memorandum to his fellow Justices accompanying an early
draft of the Roe opinion, “You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first trimester is
critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally
arbitrary.” See Jonathan English, Abortion Evolution: How Roe v. Wade Has Come to Support a Pro-
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Court to do so in a future case. Although the trimester lines provided
straightforward boundaries for courts and legislatures to follow, Roe was
always more fundamentally a test of viability, as this was the point that
separated when a state could proscribe abortion, and when it could not.
Thus, the Montana Supreme Court was not incoherent in its references to
Roe while discussing its own viability framework in Armstrong, and the
Court’s utilization of the Armstrong 2.0 test in a future case would not constitute a departure from its prior holding.
Discussion of Griswold on the Convention floor made clear that the
right to privacy protected in Article II, Section 10, includes procreative autonomy.206 Because the language of Section 10 is explicit that this right—
including its procreative autonomy component—“shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest,”207 and because privacy
is also a fundamental right listed in the Montana Constitution’s Declaration
of Rights, any restrictions on abortion should be subject to strict scrutiny.208
A strict scrutiny analysis is also consistent with the standard of review applied by five of the six state supreme courts highlighted above.
Consistent with the determinations of several of those state courts, the
Montana Supreme Court would likely find that some restrictions on abortion could be justified by a compelling state interest—as required by the
text of Article II, Section 10—in the health and safety of the patient. However, in contrast to the undue burden test set out in Casey, these pre-viability regulations would be subject to strict scrutiny.
Similarly consistent with the application of strict scrutiny by the state
supreme courts discussed above, the State of Montana could cite to a compelling interest in the potentiality of life in restricting abortions after the
point of viability. Therefore, because this interest would allow the state to
create restrictions that ban abortion outright post-viability, such late-term
abortions lie outside the scope of the autonomy privacy guaranteed by Article II, Section 10, under an Armstrong 2.0 analysis.
IV. APPLICATION

TO

RECENT LEGISLATION

IN

MONTANA

The fourth and most recent wave of Montana’s post-1973 abortion legislation occurred in the 2021 legislative session, when the Legislature
passed four major bills restricting abortion in Montana: (1) The Pain-CapaLife & Pro-Choice Position, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 157, 193–94 (citing Memorandum from Justice
Blackmun to United States Supreme Court (Nov. 21, 1972) (on file with the Library of Congress)).
206. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT VOL. 5, supra note 31, at 1681; see also Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d
364, 377 (Mont. 1999).
207. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
208. See Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374.
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ble Unborn Child Protection Act209 which banned abortions at 20 weeks210
and created criminal penalties for noncompliance;211 (2) the Abortion-Inducing Drug Risk Protocol Act,212 which placed restrictions on the distribution of medication abortions, including requirements that a medical practitioner “independently verify that a pregnancy exists,”213 obtain informed
consent at least 24 hours before the medication is provided,214 and “inform
the woman that the woman may see the remains of the unborn child in the
process of completing the abortion,”215 while creating criminal penalties for
noncompliance;216 (3) an amendment to the Abortion Control Act of 1974
requiring abortion providers to inform the patient of the opportunity to view
an ultrasound of the fetus and listen to the fetal heart tone;217 and (4) a bill
prohibiting abortion coverage in insurance plans available through the Montana health insurance marketplace.218
In response to these four bills restricting access to abortion, on August
16, 2021,219 Planned Parenthood of Montana and a Montana physician220
brought suit against the state, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from
the laws.221 In their complaint, the plaintiffs asserted that the four laws “violate the right to privacy of women seeking pre-viability abortions in Montana without being narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling State interest, in violation of Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.”222
The plaintiffs cited Armstrong throughout the complaint to support their
arguments that the laws were unconstitutional.223 The district court granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the state enforcing the
20-week ban, the restrictions on medication abortions, and the law requiring
that providers offer an ultrasound.224
209. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-601 to 50-20-606 (2021).
210. Id. § 50-20-603.
211. Id. § 50-20-604.
212. Id. §§ 50-20-701 to 50-20-714.
213. Id. § 50-20-705(1)(a).
214. Id. § 50-20-707(2).
215. Id. § 50-20-705(1)(c).
216. Id. § 50-20-711.
217. Id. § 50-20-113.
218. Id. § 33-22-116.
219. Complaint at cover page, Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, https://perma.cc/8CUEADB6 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Aug. 16, 2021) (No. 13-DV-21-0999).
220. Id. at 6.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 51.
223. See, e.g., id. at 2, 3, 7.
224. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 35, Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, https://
perma.cc/9E2G-XFF4 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Oct. 7, 2021) (No. 13-DV-21-0999).
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The state has since filed its notice of appeal with the Montana Supreme Court.225 In its opening brief, the state explicitly argued that Armstrong should be overruled.226 The brief’s arguments summarily dismissed
the protections of autonomy privacy in the Montana Constitution, describing Article II, Section 10 as a “provision meant to prevent government
snooping.”227 The state additionally argued that the delegates to the 1972
Convention “chose to leave that abortion policy firmly in the hands of the
Legislature,”228 and as for a recognized right to pre-viability abortion,
“Montana women don’t need it.”229
In an amicus curiae brief filed by Bob Campbell and other delegates to
the 1972 Convention, the amici defended the Court’s decision in Armstrong, emphasizing the “repeated references to Griswold in the drafting of
Article II, Section 10 and in its presentation and debate on the Convention
floor,”230 as well as the delegates’ “understanding that the courts would
interpret the Declaration of Rights consistent with both the Delegates’ original intent and the demands of an evolving society.”231
This pending litigation challenging the Legislature’s 2021 abortion
bills presents an opportunity to apply the simplified Armstrong 2.0 test advocated for in this paper. As a threshold matter, the Court would not need to
apply the Katz test to determine whether the activities regulated by these
laws are within the scope of the right of privacy, as the Court in Armstrong
settled this question regarding any laws infringing on procreative autonomy. Thus, because each of these laws implicates the right to privacy, the
text of Article II, Section 10 requires the showing of a compelling state
interest. For this reason and because the law implicates a fundamental right
within the Montana Constitution’s Declaration of Rights, under the Armstrong 2.0 test, the Court would apply strict scrutiny.
First, because the 20-week abortion ban applies to abortions well
before the 23- to 24-week viability line,232 the only interest the state could
cite as compelling is the health and safety of the patient. The state cited this
225. Defendant’s Notice of Appeal at 1, Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, https://perma.cc/
Q2HF-JGGS (Mont. Oct. 19, 2021) (No. DA-21-0521).
226. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15, Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, https://perma.cc/
7KSL-WQS6 (Mont. Jan. 20, 2022) (No. DA-21-0521).
227. Id. at 18.
228. Id. at 19.
229. Id. at 23.
230. Amicus Curiae Brief of Montana Constitutional Convention Delegates & Research Staff in
Support of Plaintiffs/Appellees at 16, Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, https://perma.cc/GAA9GRP7 (Mont. Mar. 24, 2022) (No. DA-21-0521).
231. Id. at 15.
232. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (plurality), overruled by
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 191392).
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interest before the district court in the recent litigation, although it also asserted an interest in fetal life.233 Because the latter is not a compelling state
interest prior to viability, only the former would be considered under Armstrong 2.0. In continuing the analysis, because the statute itself ties the 20week cutoff to the Legislature’s determination of when a fetus experiences
pain,234 this line has nothing to do with the health or safety of the patient.
Although the state argued before the district court that the 20-week ban
“protects women from risky late-term abortions,”235 it pointed to no evidence indicating a 20-week pre-viability abortion is any more “risky” than,
for example, a 19-week pre-viability abortion. In addition, the law does not
merely add additional health and safety measures; it institutes an outright
ban. Therefore, the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act—or at least
the key component highlighted here—is not narrowly tailored to any compelling state interest and would fail strict scrutiny under Armstrong 2.0.
Second, regarding the restrictions on abortion pills in the AbortionInducing Drug Risk Protocol Act, such medication abortions are only medically recommended for very early pregnancies236—much earlier than the
point of viability. Therefore, the only compelling interest for this law, as
applied to pre-viability abortions, would be the state’s interests in patient
health, which the state asserted as its purpose in district court—“protect[ing] patient safety.”237 However, the state cites no evidence that the
law’s provisions further such a purpose,238 except with regard to informed
consent requirements, whereby information provided by the doctor on
“risks like hemorrhage or death” may result in the patient “avoiding” such
outcomes.239 Although such references reinforce the state’s stated interest
in patient safety, the law in its entirety demonstrates a stunning lack of
narrow tailoring. Provisions prohibiting medical practitioners from shipping
medications to their patients by mail240 or providing medications at any
postsecondary facilities241 may survive the Court’s rational basis review,
but would undoubtedly fail the demands of strict scrutiny under Armstrong
2.0. Instead, by merely “usurping, through laws or regulations which dictate
233. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, Planned Parenthood
of Montana v. State, https://perma.cc/XK5V-BGRQ (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 7, 2021) (No. 13-DV-210999).
234. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-603(1)(b) (2021).
235. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 233, at 9.
236. Medical Abortion, MAYO CLINIC, https://perma.cc/VD6C-27ES (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
237. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 233, at 7.
238. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-20-702 (legislative findings); Defendants’ Brief in Opposition,
supra note 233, at 7–9.
239. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 233, at 7–8; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20707(5)(c).
240. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-20-704.
241. Id. § 50-20-706.
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how and by whom a specific medical procedure is to be performed, the
patient’s own informed health care decisions made in partnership with his
or her chosen health care provider,”242 the Abortion-Inducing Drug Risk
Protocol Act violates the autonomy privacy protected by Article II, Section
10.
Third, regarding the amendment to the Abortion Control Act requiring
providers to offer an ultrasound to the patient prior to performing an abortion, the state asserted that because the law does not require the patient to
actually undergo an ultrasound, it does not infringe any of the patient’s
rights.243 However, because the law nonetheless dictates the conversations a
patient must have with her doctor and the decisions she must make prior to
an abortion, it undoubtedly implicates the autonomy privacy protected by
Article II, Section 10. Because the law applies to pre-viability abortions, the
only compelling interest the state could assert is the health of the patient.
However, the state does not even attempt to point to such an interest, instead insisting that the law’s purpose is in “empower[ing] women to more
fully understand the nature of the procedure.”244 Because this interest could
not be justified as compelling for the state, the absence of this interest in
infringing the right of privacy directly violates the text of Article II, Section
10.
Finally, regarding the 2021 bill prohibiting abortion coverage in insurance plans available through Montana’s health insurance marketplace, because the law fails to except pre-viability abortions, its application to such
abortions can be justified only by a compelling state interest in patient
health. Although it is unclear whether the state will use such an argument in
the pending litigation, what is clear is that this law serves no purpose other
than to “place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion,”245 by “mak[ing] it as difficult, as inconvenient and as costly as
possible.”246
A prior Montana district court case had challenged a similar administrative regulation that prohibited state Medicaid funding for abortions, except when—in addition to other requirements—“the recipient certifie[d] in
writing that the pregnancy resulted from an act of rape or incest.”247 There,
in answering the question of “whether the state, having enacted a general
242. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380 (Mont. 1999).
243. Defendant’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 233, at 13.
244. Id.
245. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality) (discussing what
constitutes an undue burden), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. ___, 2022
U.S. LEXIS 3057 (June 24, 2022) (No. 19-1392).
246. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 381.
247. Jeannette R. v. Ellery, 1995 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 795, at *1 (May 22, 1995) (No. BDV-94-811)
(quoting MONT. ADMIN. R. 46.12.2002 (1)(f)(i) (repealed)).
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program to provide medical services to the poor, may selectively withhold
such benefits from otherwise qualified persons solely because such persons
seek to exercise their constitutional right of procreative choice in a manner
which the state does not favor and does not wish to support,”248 the district
court held that this withholding of benefits violated the right to privacy
under Article II, Section 10.249
In looking to the court’s reasoning in the prior case, it becomes clear
that although the 2021 law provides exceptions for when “the life of the
mother is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical
injury, [or] . . . the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest,” the
law is remarkably overbroad in its withholding of insurance benefits for
pre-viability abortions.250 Therefore, it would not survive strict scrutiny
under Armstrong 2.0.
V. CONCLUSION
The above application of the Armstrong 2.0 test to the four bills restricting access to abortion, passed by the Montana Legislature in 2021,
leads to a relatively straightforward conclusion as to their unconstitutionality under Montana’s express right to individual privacy protected by Article
II, Section 10.
However, in the absence of a clear and simplified test, one can imagine
a divided Montana Supreme Court in a post-Roe world—and in the aftermath of a bill passed in the 2023 legislative session directing that “[e]very
woman . . . who submits to any operation, or to the use of any means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure a miscarriage, . . . is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than five
years”251—debating whether the plaintiffs have shown that the right to a
“lawful medical procedure”252 is any longer even implicated.
To avoid such a future, the Montana Supreme Court should use the
present opportunity, provided by the challenges to the 2021 laws, to affirm
that Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution protects the fundamental right of procreative autonomy, which includes the right to a previability abortion.
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